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Abstract  
In the last 15 years, conservation has shifted increasingly towards perspectives based on the 
instrumental value of nature, where what counts is what provides benefits to humans. The 
ecosystem services framework embraces this vision of nature through monetary valuation of 
the environment to correct market failures and government distortions that hinder efficient 
allocation of public goods, including goods and services provided by biodiversity and 
ecosystems. The popularity of this approach is reflected in different countries legislation; for 
instance, US, EU and UK have introduced economic criteria for comparing costs and benefits 
of environmental policies in protecting ecosystem services.  
From an operational perspective, the ecosystem services framework requires ecologists to 
estimate how the supply of services is affected by changes in the functionality and/or the 
extent of ecosystems; and economists to identify how changes in the supply affect the flow of 
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direct and indirect benefits to people. However, this approach may be simplistic when faced 
with the complexity of social-ecological systems. We investigated this for three different 
marine services: assimilative capacity of waste, coastal defense and renewable energy. We 
find that economic valuation could provide efficient and fair allocations in the case of 
assimilative capacity, but leads to social clashes between outputs generated by cost benefit 
analysis and FLWL]HQV¶ expectation in the case of coastal defense. In the case of renewable 
energy, controversies can be generated by regulatory mechanisms that are not necessarily 
aligned with the interests of industry or important social groups. We conclude that there is a 
need to integrate perspectives arising from utilitarian allocation of resources with those 
involving legislation and communal values in order to reconcile conflicting interests and 
better sustain marine social-ecological systems.  
 
Keywords: marine ecosystem services, economic valuation, legislation, social-ecological 
systems, complexity 
 
Highlights 
1. A social-ecological framework analyses three marine ecosystem services (ES) 
2. Assimilative capacity, coastal defence and renewable energy are object of study 
3. The role of economics, regulation and civil society is debated for the three ES  
4. Economics shows some axiomatic issues in guaranteeing the provision of these ES 
5. Other institutions are required to enable social learning and conflicts resolution  
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1. Introduction  
Ecosystem-based management principles (Garcia et al. 2003) have led to new forms of 
governance and management of natural resources. In terms of coastal and marine resources, 
there has been a proliferation of new paradigms, such as those for ecosystem-based fisheries 
management (Garcia et al. 2003; Staples et al. 2014), Integrated Coastal Zone Management, 
Marine Spatial Planning and the Ecosystem Services framework within public policy 
processes (Fisher et al. 2009). From an operational perspective, the ecosystem services 
framework requires ecologists to estimate how ecosystems supply services supported by 
complex ecological functions and processes; economists and other social scientists to identify 
how changes in ecosystem services provision affect the flow of direct and indirect benefits; 
and ecologists and economists to work together to define how services are provided under the 
complex interactions of social-ecological systems. For policymaking purposes, the ecosystem 
services  framework can be seen as a tool for integration of environmental, social and 
economic knowledge (Danley and Widmark 2016). It can be used to conceptualise the social 
system as the human users of the ecological system (Binder et al. 2013) and contributes to the 
renaissance of the conservation paradigm ³QDWXUH for SHRSOH´ (Mace 2014), where decisions 
are derived on the basis of instrumental support (generation of wellbeing) from nature to 
humans.  
The broad diffusion of the ecosystem services framework was promoted by the surge of 
monetary valuations that have in turn stimulated implementation of finance mechanisms 
based on nature commodification (OECD 2013). This is reflective of a perceived increased 
influence of economic decisions in policy mechanisms (Pearce et al. 2006; Carey 2014): in 
those contexts where system uncertainty is limited, and decisions are top-down, monetization 
has become the common denominator to discriminate positive and negative impacts of 
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decision-making on human wellbeing, and Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) the tool of choice to 
classify good and bad projects, and policies through a technocratic approach aimed at 
maximising social welfare (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; 1994). These monetary approaches 
are part of a utilitarian, efficiency-based way of thinking grounded in the moral aim to 
provide the greatest volume of net benefits (expressed as a monetary measure of utility) for 
the aggregate of people affected by a decision, independent of the nature or distribution of 
benefits and costs.  
In recent years, however, this utilitarian perspective of ecosystem service management has 
been evolving into an approach that better recognizes the two-way dynamic relationship 
between people and nature (Mace 2014, Carpenter et al. 2009). Nature and society can be 
seen as the two interlinked components of social-ecological systems where democratic debate 
and institutional regulations are recognised mechanisms to allocate environmental resources; 
both directly and by providing boundaries and constraints for markets to operate (Tett and 
Sandberg 2011). From this perspective, ecosystem services can be seen as socially and 
institutionally structured. More broadly, the coupled nature of social and ecological systems 
means they should not be seen as an independent flow from ecosystems to humans but as co-
produced and culturally co-constructed (Church et al. 2014; Fish et al. 2016; Jones et al. 
2016; Fischer and Eastwood 2016; Kenter 2018) by society.  
While systemic ideas of ecosystem services have started to evolve and become more 
prominent in the ecosystem services literature, they have seen little penetration of the marine 
ecosystem services field. Recent economic literature on marine services has focused on 
scientific limitations in linking ecological functioning and services, and on the challenge of 
adopting stated preference valuations where knowledge on ecosystem services generated by 
unknown marine ecosystems is limited (Jobstvogt et al. 2014a; 2014b; Hanley et al. 2015). 
Moreover, this literature has little analysed the role of society, and institutions, in the 
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production of ecosystem services (Rova and Pranovi 2017). This paper is novel in 
exemplifying the role of social and legislative aspects in marine ecosystem service provision, 
in contrast to addressing marine services only through a welfare-based economic valuation. 
Society-nature interactions in marine systems have traditionally been addressed within 
technocratic frameworks, such as DPSIR (Luiten, 1999). Since it was proposed by OECD, 
the DPSIR framework has evolved. Patricio et al. (2016) evaluated more than 25 schemes 
produced to analyse decision making across ecosystems, but they found that there is a limited 
use in marine ecosystems; to fill this gap, Elliot et al. (2017) developed a new DPSIR-like 
concept to be more effective for marine ecosystem management. The importance of local 
stakeholder perspectives has been more recently recognised in the valuation (Murray et al. 
2016) and quantifications of ecosystem services within broader social perspectives (Gari et 
al. 2015; Orchard-Webb et al. 2016). Furthermore, international surveys show that linking 
ecosystem services and human wellbeing, and integrating economics, natural and social 
sciences into ecosystem services assessments, are important research issues (Rivero and 
Villasante 2016; Bull et al. 2016). These contributions emphasise the need for a greater 
inclusion of stakeholders positions (views) into the decision-making process, as 
recommended by principle 11 of the Ecosystem Approach (CBD 2004).1  
It is recognised that although the marginal approach to valuation (i.e. based on mathematical 
functions to assess incremental changes of the value of an environmental good or service) can 
provide a pathway towards the efficient management of some resources and ecosystem 
services (Tscherning et al. 2012), broader shared, cultural and ethical values may additionally 
influence the acceptability of different management decisions (Farber et al. 2006; Rehr et al. 
                                                 
1
 "The ecosystem approach should consider all forms of relevant information, including scientific and 
indigenous and local knowledge, innovations and practices" 
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2012; Kenter et al. 2015; Raymond and Kenter 2016) and improve fair allocations of 
ecosystem services amongst stakeholders (Ranger et al. 2016,  Orchard-Webb et al. 2016). 
Decision-makers are faced with the dilemma of how to balance ecological, economic, and 
broader shared, social and cultural values. Moreover, addressing who is the recipient of 
particular benefits and costs from ecosystem services and how this inter-relates with property, 
legal and other rights and obligations, is an essential part of democratic governance. 
Monetary aggregations of individual, self-regarding preferences within CBA does not 
accommodate an impartial distribution of natural resources (Turner et al. 2014; Kenter et al. 
2015; Irvine et al. 2016). Although distributional analysis of impacts and equity weighting 
can be included into CBA (Pearce et al. 2006), this raises questions of how to weight 
different benefits and costs and dimensions of value, generating the need for deliberation 
(Kenter et al. 2014b; 2015). For example, multiple ³EDODQFH VKHHWV´ (Turner, 2016) can be 
generated to accommodate plural and collective views into decisional processes particularly 
to address the management of natural resources at local scale. The recognition of pluralistic 
ways of conceiving of and integrating plural values and non-statutory social norms through 
deliberative processes (Kenter 2016a; Kenter et al. 2015) takes the valuation of ecosystem 
services well beyond the utilitarian framework.  
In this paper, we show some methodological and axiomatic issues in the monetary valuation 
of ecosystem services and then, building on the social-ecological systems model proposed by 
Tett and Sandberg (2011), we explore the limits of the choice of a pure utilitarian approach in 
a marine and coastal context, with examples of three different marine ecosystem services. 
Tett and Sandberg (2011) model,  formulated to support Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management (ICZM), proposed decisional mechanisms within the environmental governance 
of natural resources as triggers of supply and demand of ecosystem services not yet described 
in recent ecosystem services frameworks proposed for example in the UK NEA (2011) and 
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by IPBES (Diaz et al. 2015). We show how to synthetize the link between the Tett and 
Sandberg (2011) model with the McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) framework for common 
resource management to complement Habermas¶ theory of society (1987) that deals little 
with human-environmental relationships, to explicit the influence of social and institutional 
aspects on the traditional allocations of resources vaguely expressed in the UK NEA (2011) 
and IPBES (Diaz et al. 2015) frameworks. 
2. Methodological and axiomatic issues in ecosystem services valuation  
Policy-makers and regulators are placing increasing demands on economists to supply 
environmental values for use in policy analysis (Hanley et al. 2015). For example, EU 
Directives such as the revised Bathing Waters Directive (2006/7/EC) and the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive (MSFD- 2008/56/EC), and the 1996 amendments to the US Safe 
Drinking Water Act, all depend on economic analysis to assess the costs and benefits of 
improving water quality. In the UK, recent conservation legislation embedded in the Marine 
and Coastal Access Act 2009 and the Marine Scotland Act 2010 requires economic impact 
analysis to assess the benefits and costs of designating new marine protected areas (MPAs). 
Benefits and costs of implementing such policies can be synthesized in the CBA framework 
to provide a ranking of more or less efficient options. Furthermore, estimation of benefit - 
cost ratios can identify cases where derogations can be sought if costs are extremely high 
compared to the social benefits (Atkins et al. 2007). Examples of studies that resulted from 
this policy impetus include Hanley et al. (2003) and Hynes et al. (2013), who assessed the 
benefits of improving coastal water quality, while Ostberg et al. (2012) and Norton and 
Hynes (2014) assessed the monetary benefits of achieving good environmental status (GES) 
in EU marine waters. Research within the UK addressed the economic benefits for 
designation of a network of MPAs, showing figures of nearly £17 billion in present value 
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(Mc Vittie and Moran, 2010). Estimates of cultural and recreational values of MPAs were 
undertaken as part of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment by Jobstvogt et al. (2014a) and 
Kenter et al. (2013). The latter estimated the present value of additional non-use benefits of 
marine protection between £0.7 and £1.3 billion and a benefit-cost ratio of between 1.1 and 
5.8 for designating a comprehensive network of 127 new MPAs in England (depending on 
what implementation measures would be put in place). The importance of valuation is 
recognized also in those aspects of coastal management that have not yet received formal 
legislative support. For example, the implementation of ³blue carbon´ markets (Hejnowicz et 
al. 2015) can be facilitated by showing monetary tradeoffs between different ecosystem 
services and associated beneficiaries (Beaumont et al. 2014).  
Two main issues are emerging in the environmental economics of resource management. The 
first is the reliability with which ecology and economics can calculate a utility change from a 
change in ecosystem services provided by the environment. The second concerns the need to 
understand the limits of neo-classical economic approaches in relation to their ability to 
inform decisions around natural resource management, and what other kinds of valuation can 
or should be used to complement economic information.  
Concerning the first issue, we note that what is required is a quantitative understanding of 
linkages between ecosystem function, ecosystem services, and human well-being. In many 
marine cases, we do not know enough about these links. For example, we have limited and 
uncertain knowledge about the role of the deep-sea in terms of supporting and regulating 
services, and there may be significant unknown potential in terms of genetic and chemical 
resources (Jobstvogt et al. 2014b). In the case of energy production from marine renewables, 
the valuation of the resulting externalities on provisioning (fisheries), and regulating (climate 
change, nutrient regulation) services remains uncertain (Papathanasopoulou et al. 2015). In 
other cases the linkages are known to be non-linear, as for example shown for mangrove 
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ecosystems by Barbier et al. (2008) and in some cases involving tipping points with abrupt 
changes in species abundance, community composition and trophic organization in the 
marine food web (Collie et al. 2004). Furthermore, economic valuation techniques also have 
significant limitations. For example, the use of stated preferences methods for valuing 
biodiversity, where participants are asked for their willingness to pay for a gain or 
willingness to accept for a loss of ecosystem services, is limited by stakeholders' lack of 
knowledge and experience of ecosystem functions and services (e.g. those of the deep sea), 
although researchers have nonetheless attempted to assess values for these unfamiliar 
ecosystem services in recent years (Glenn et al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012; Jobstvogt et al. 
2014b). There have been only very limited changes in environmental economic valuation 
methods during the last 40 years (Hanley and Barbier 2009) to address such issues; primarily 
the introduction of choice experiments for natural resource valuation and the more recent 
development of deliberated preferences techniques (Alvarez-Farizo et al. 2007; Kenter et al. 
2011; Kenter 2016b; Kenter 2017).  
Concerning the second issue, even when ecological and economic uncertainty can be 
minimized and a robust economic valuation carried out, policy and management justified by 
efficiency-based economic tools can suffer from challenges to decisions when they do not 
address equity issues and reflect broader shared and cultural values (Irvine et al. 2016). 
Moreover, where national policies increasingly require technocratic tools such as CBA, at 
local and regional scales decision makers are more likely to benefit from evidence that is 
generated in a more participatory way, and which engages key stakeholder interests (Reed 
2008; Ravenscroft 2010; Kenter et al. 2014a,b; Ranger et al. 2016). In some cases, the 
adoption of CBA on its own limits the pluralism required to address multifunctional systems 
with many stakeholders (Seppelt et al. 2011), and, furthermore, addresses only 
anthropocentric and single XVHUV¶ preferences when valuing ecosystem services benefits 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
(Burkhard et al 2014; Queiroz et al 2015). Science has a role to play in this deliberation, but 
new tools addressing the issues of a post normal science are required (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
1994, Ravetz 1996, Waltner-Toews et al. 2008; Ainscough et al. 2018). There is a need for an 
integrated natural and social science approach as part of an ongoing adaptive assessment 
process to understand how public and stakeholder values and preferences respond to new 
information and deal with more decisional power to reduce uncertainty (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1994; Milon and Scrogin 2006). Thus, a broader vision encompassing a range of tools 
and approaches is needed, to allow differences in VWDNHKROGHUV¶ interests to be deliberated in 
public and diverse views and values to interact with ecosystem governance (Fisher et al. 
2015; Hattam et al. 2015). A possible way to bring in alternative institutional and social 
approaches is offered by the concept of social-ecological systems (Berkes and Folke, 1998). 
In some social-ecological models describing ecological functions to humans, integration 
between ecological functioning (natural component of the ecosystem) and human activities 
(the economic component of the anthropogenic system) has been facilitated by the 
implementation of the DPSIR approach (de Jong et al., 2012; Nassl and Löffler, 2015; 
Patricio et al., 2017). Other approaches to socio-ecological models more applicable to our 
study emphasize the importance of governance as the element balancing the two-way 
interactions between human wellbeing and ES provided by natural capital (stocks of natural 
assets which include geology, soil, air, water and all living things) (UK NEA 2014; Diaz et 
al., 2015). Governance is also seen  as one of the four elements determining the action-
situation of common pool resources in Ostrom (2007) and McGinnis and Ostrom( 2014) 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 here 
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Rova and Pranovi (2017) have linked 2VWURP¶V approach explicitly to an ecosystem services 
conceptualization. Under this framework, the services may be either what Rova and Pranovi 
(2017) distinguish as µPHGLDWHG IORZV¶ (in which the resource units are themselves consumed 
and mediated by the need of human and built capital, for example by a fishery) or what they 
call µGLUHFW IORZV¶ (in which the units are used for their ecological functions).  
Our approach uses the social-ecological framework proposed by Tett and Sandberg (2011) 
and Tett et al. (2013), which distinguishes three ways in which society manages ecosystem 
services.  
 
Figure 2 here  
 
Figure 2 is a conceptual model that is both an ontological representation of key processes in 
society in relation to ecosystem services, and an epistemological claim that the analysis of 
such a system requires the joint efforts of economics, sociology and ecology to determine 
solutions that must have the property to be economically efficient, socially equitable and 
ecologically sustainable. The diagram shows three mechanisms that distribute services 
provided by natural capital: the market, top-down regulation, and collective arrangements. 
The market is the domain of individual interacting choices by consumers and firms. Top-
down regulation seeks to harmonise societal life at a central level. Collective arrangements 
are the agreements and rules that groups harness to inform bottom-up collective actions. 
These three mechanisms correspond to three components of +DEHUPDV¶ model of society 
(Habermas 1987, figure 39). The first two mechanisms involve the institutions of media-
steered subsystems, where the media are money (in the case of the market) and power 
(legitimately exercised by elected governments). The third set of mechanisms are those of the 
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public and private spheres that in the +DEHUPDV¶ model are called  lifeworld, i.e. the 
environment where ideas of social importance are mediated through cooperative action 
undertaken by individuals based upon mutual deliberation and argumentation. Because there 
is little in +DEHUPDV¶ theory that deals with human-environment relationships (Skollerhorn 
1998; Cameron 2009), we combine the concept of the three mechanisms with 2VWURP¶s 
categorization of the factors needing to be evaluated in understanding µaction situations¶ that 
involve the use of natural resources (Figure 3). The primary factors to be described are those 
specifying the type and functionalities of the resource system, the resource units, the 
(resource) users, renamed as actors by  McGinniss and Ostrom (2014), and the governance 
system of the local social ecological system (Ostrom 2007, 2009). We equate resource 
systems with ecosystems including any human modifications thereof, and the resource units 
with what is providing the ecosystem service required by the users. Ostrom's users can be co-
located within the two spheres of the lifeworld, while Ostrom's governance system (Figure 1) 
whose component are the Economic System, the Administrative System, and Civil Society, 
corresponds to the main mechanisms of our three routes for societal management of the 
benefits of ecosystem services (Figure 2), and to the Economic System, the Administrative 
system, and the Private & Public Spheres proposed by +DEHUPDV¶ model of society (1987) 
(Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Finally, almost all social ecological systems (excepting that of the planet Earth as a whole) 
are embedded in larger scale social ecological systems, and it is thus necessary to take 
account of related ecosystems and social, economic and political settings (Ostrom 2007). Our 
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three mechanisms tend to operate on different scales: the life world mechanisms are largely 
local, whereas the economic settings correspond to the scales of national economies which 
are in turn strongly influenced by globalised flows of commodities and capital, and the 
political (and legal) settings are in the 8.¶V case ostensibly national, but in fact strongly 
influenced by trans-national agreements including, for the time being, those associated with 
membership of the EU. Thus, it will be necessary to take account of tiers of governance 
(Ostrom 2007).  
 
3. Implementation of the methodological approach in three examples from the UK 
Taking the classification of services provided by the UK National Ecosystem Assessment 
(UK NEA 2011; 2014) and CICES (2017)2, we consider two regulating services (assimilative 
capacity from a sea-loch and coastal defense provided by managed realignment), and one 
provisioning service (generation of renewable energy from offshore winds and marine 
physical processes), whose location is shown in Figure 4. The aim is to understand and 
describe how utilitarian (money-steered) solutions may run up against complex social issues, 
and suggest how the traditional allocation of resources might be better integrated within 
social and institutional processes to help achieve sustainable use of marine ecosystem 
services.  
Figure 4 here 
 
                                                 
2
 The UK NEA (2011) does not consider energy production an ecosystem services like CICES (2017), but 
provides the definition of assimilative capacity used in section 3.1 
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3.1 Assimilative capacity 
The assimilative capacity is the ability of a water body to absorb a certain amount of the 
unintentional by-products of a human activity and to convert them in non-damaging and even 
beneficial products (Tett et al. 2011a). The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA, 
2014) views assimilative capacity as an indicator for the intermediate ecosystem service 
contributing to the removal of waste which falls into the category of regulating services. 
Although it is important for accounting reasons to avoid the monetary quantification of 
intermediate services (Turner et al. 2014), it is worthwhile to explain the indirect benefits 
accruing to society from assimilative capacity and in what terms economics can play a 
pivotal role in protecting it.  
To exemplify the importance of this service, we refer to the specific case of Loch Creran (a 
resource system)3, a sea-loch (fjord) in western Scotland (Tett and Wallis 1978; Tett 2008) 
(Figure 5).  
Figure 5 here  
This is a site where farms for salmon and bivalves, moorings and yacht anchorages, and a 
Special Area of Conservation (an EU protected area designation) co-exist (Buchan and 
McConnel 2006; Tett 2008). Therefore, amongst the obvious goods/benefits (outcomes) 
accruing to people and society from this loch are those categorized by the UK NEA (2014) as 
³IDUPHG IRRG´ and ³WRXULVP and nature-ZDWFKLQJ´ The benefits from the farming of fish and 
from services to tourism and recreation depend on two key ecosystem processes underlying 
assimilative capacity: the circulation of water and the burial and breakdown of organic matter 
                                                 
3
 In the sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the terms in the bracket and in italics refer to element of the governance for 
common resources as described by McGinniss and Ostrom (2014)  
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(Figure 6), which neutralize or export nutrients, brought into the system from the catchment 
and fish farms, that might give rise to eutrophication. However, if the nutrient emissions 
exceed a threshold, not only will there be contamination of the watercourses, but the EXIIHUV¶ 
assimilative capacity will be impaired (Fromm 2000). Under the latter circumstance, the 
assimilative capacity can be treated as a normal economic good showing a decreasing benefit 
as a function of the level of service provided.  
Figure 6 here 
If there were no such capacity, fish farmers would need to collect and process waste as city-
dwellers are required to do. This suggests a simple method for pricing the assimilative 
capacity based on replacement cost of installing waste treatment at a fish farm to achieve 
degradation of, for a typical farm with a consented maximum of 1500 tonnes of fish, 104 
tonnes of nitrogen and 25 tonnes of phosphorus per year (Tett et al. 2011b), a waste 
production equivalent to a city of about 10,000 people (Tett et al. 2008). Other approaches 
valuing welfare at the aggregate level could price this service based on stated or revealed 
preferences for marginal changes of recreational activities in the loch determined by water 
quality modifications (Hanley et al. 2003, Hynes et al. 2013), or changes in productivity in 
capture fisheries or shellfish aquaculture by the production function approach (Oczkowski 
and Nixon 2008).  
The possibility to get benefits from this service depends on the regulatory and economic tools 
arranged by the governance system to reduce free riders. Although fish farms pay rent to the 
Crown Estate (an independent commercial business managing a real estate portfolio owned 
by the UK Government) for their use of the seabed as an anchorage, this rental does not 
explicitly include any element of paying for ecosystem services. The Scottish portfolio of the 
Crown Estate, including almost all fish farm leases, has recently been transferred to the 
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oversight of the devolved Government of Scotland (Anonymous, 2017). A recent review 
(GVA Grimley Ltd, 2016) states rents to be 0.025 GBP per kg annual fish production and 
justifies these in relation to industry profits rather than use of marine resources. Because the 
cost of pollution is not internalized, water pollution represents an aspect of the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin 1968) and it is rational to make use of ³IUHH´ assimilative capacity rather 
than sharing the cost of farm waste treatments. The limited progress so far made with the 
solution of this problem is addressed by regulation, without necessarily achieving efficiency. 
Scottish local governments give development consent to farms subject inter alia to the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) issuing a license to discharge waste under 
the Scottish 'Controlled Activities regulations' (Tett et al. 2015), and set an upper limit to a 
loch's farming capacity, based partly on the ³(TXLOLEULXP Concentration EnhancemeQW´ 
model of Gillibrand & Turrell (1997). In other words, the estimate of capacity depends on a 
socially-agreed limit to the use of the watershed, by reducing the intensity of aquacultural 
production and of agricultural inputs (i.e. organic production, tuning timing of fertilization 
and ploughing, etc. - Schoumans et al. 2014), or by promoting integrated multi-trophic 
aquaculture where shellfish or seaweed absorb some of the salmon nutrients (Tett et al. 
2011b).  
In the case of Loch Creran, limits imposed by SEPA have been respected and no 
environmental externalities have been emerged so far. However, if these regulations failed, 
assimilative capacity would be reduced (i.e. become, in economic terms, a scarce good)  and 
then perceived as a valuable resource (price higher than zero). Economics could intervene in 
this case allowing for users of this service to bargain the reduction of the harmful activities 
against monetary compensation so as to achieve the solution that provides the highest net 
social benefits to the parties overall, including the public (Coase 1960). Market approaches to 
environmental protection such as water quality trading have been adopted in the U.S., 
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Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Selman et al. 2009). However, efficacy may be reduced 
by the likely high number of stakeholders involved and consequent transaction costs (Coase 
1960). This makes the case for an alternative approach, where the state intervenes when 
pollution becomes a social concern, based on charges to remove the market failure of 
unaddressed pollution in economic transaction of marketed goods (Pigou 1932), as adopted 
with success in the Netherlands (Elkins 1999). Both approaches are meant to achieve 
environmental goals at a lower cost to society than a regulatory solution (UNEP 2010), 
reaching the point that makes the polluter indifferent between further treatment and discharge 
of pollutants. In other words, each polluter will be reducing pollution up to the point that the 
marginal cost of pollution to the society will equalize his private benefits from polluting.  
Such economic mechanisms can succeed only under well-established institutions that set who 
has the right to use the service (fish farm polluter, agriculturist, etc.) and who has the right to 
be compensated. In the example of Loch Creran, an alternative approach to regulation is not 
needed because none of the three types of signals (economic, social, institutional) described 
in Figure 2 have emerged so far. Economic valuation of assimilative capacity requires 
perception of the scarcity of this ecosystem service; social analysis of assimilative capacity 
requires the emergence of a sense of health danger amongst stakeholders; and institutional 
intervention requires the definition of property rights between actors before discussing the 
optimal level of externalities and marginal rate of economic exchange between the parties.  
 
3.2 Coastal defences  
To counteract the effects of coastal flooding, stronger hard defences are often demanded by 
citizens, whereas public bodies are concerned with the high construction and maintenance 
costs of adequate sea-walls. Furthermore, such defences may also impact on the integrity of 
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coastal habitats (French 2001) that if kept in place can provide ecosystem services, including 
natural hazard protection (absorbing flood and storm energy), and can generate economic 
benefits in terms of avoided damages to coastal capital assets as well as satisfying well-being 
needs arising from broader social and cultural values (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 here 
Natural defences, if trapped between a sea-wall and the rising sea, are subject to accelerate 
erosive processes and in turn unprotected sea-walls become increasingly exposed to high 
energy waves. An alternative to hard defences is managed re-alignment of coastal habitats 
(resource system). The sea is allowed to flood low value land and convert it to natural coastal 
habitats, which slowly adjust to rising sea level: beaches maintain natural profiles and salt 
marshes dampen wave energy and trap silt, protecting from storm and wave actions (Defra 
and EA 2005; Feagin et al. 2008; Koch et al. 2009). In addition, coastal saltmarshes provide 
other benefits in terms of regulating services (outcome) such as carbon sequestration (Cannell 
et al. 1999, Choi & Wang 2004, Beaumont et al. 2014), functioning services such as nutrient 
cycling (Howard et al. 2014), sheltered nursery sites for fish (Laffaille et al. 2000), and high 
tide refuges for birds, contributing to fulfil nature conservation objectives such as those 
associated with the creation of the EU Natura 2000 network (Doody 2008).
 
Multiple 
ecosystem services such as healthy climate (via carbon sequestration and storage), food 
provision (via fisheries production in nursery grounds), and nature recreation (nature 
watching and enjoyment) specifically provided by managed realignment schemes are 
assessed by Luisetti et al (2011; 2014).  
Several federal and national administrations provide public support to local projects if they 
prove to generate benefits to the public and cover capital and operating costs. This is the case 
in the USA (NOAA 2006) that in deciding how to allocate federal money to single states for 
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beach nourishment programmes requires the adoption of CBA for projects that receive public 
funding. Similar considerations apply to the UK where CBA is required to assess the benefits 
of policies (HM Treasury, 2003). Spending on flood defences has to be justified by benefits 
such as the protection of property of a certain total value; when the value preserved is too 
little, houses and farms may be abandoned to the rising waters. When the case for adopting 
alternative strategies to hard defence of coastal capital assets is strong according to an 
environmental CBA (taking into account externalities), managed realignment can be 
considered a viable solution. The UK Natural Capital Committee (NCC 2015) action plan for 
saltmarsh protection estimates a benefit-cost ratio of 2 - 3:1 in flood reduction and habitat 
gain from managed realignment, even without taking into account possible additional and 
long term gains provided by carbon sequestration or other unpriced regulating services 
beyond flood protection.  
In these cases, the coastal defence service is valued at what it would have cost to build or 
maintain sea-walls, less the value of sacrificed land, plus the value of services provided by 
the new natural habitats. Shepherd et al. (2007) and Andrews et al. (2006) estimated that 
managed realignment projects would pay off after 25 years for schemes applied to the 
Humber estuary (northeast England) and after 50-100 years for the Blackwater estuary 
(southeast England), due in part to the value of the additional ecosystem services created by 
the re-alignment. Examples of CBA where net present values (NPV) of managed schemes are 
compared to NPV of keeping the defence (status quo) are provided by Turner et al. (2007) 
and Luisetti et al. (2011) for the Humber and Blackwater estuaries, respectively, under 
different policy scenarios, discount rates and lifespan of the schemes. For the Blackwater, 
NPVs were between -£24m and £37m, casting doubt on the viability of a realignment. The 
Humber case, however, showed only positive NPVs, between £70m and £300m. The results 
for the two examples highlight that the values are sensitive to the scale of the realignment 
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scheme and the local topography, and thus a general conclusion cannot be provided (Luisetti 
et al. 2011; 2014).  
The Steart case (southwest England) is more complex. The low-lying land of the Somerset 
Levels is at risk of flooding from both the sea and rivers. A managed realignment, to better 
protect against the risk of marine incursions and at the same time to compensate for habitat 
losses to hard defences elsewhere in the region, had been planned since 2002 and had been 
evaluated as showing a net benefit to ecosystem services (da Silva et al. 2014). However, a 
few months before the scheme was completed in September 2014, river-derived flooding 
inundated large parts of the Levels. The causes of this flooding were disputed, ranging from 
unusually heavy rainfall on already-saturated catchments (Anonymous 2014) to failure to 
dredge the river channels, and the flood events led substantial popular doubt and opposition 
in relation to the re-alignment works, backed up by hostile reporting in some newspapers and 
issues raised in debate in the UK Parliament4. Although the Steart scheme was intensively 
researched before it was executed, there remain at the time of writing competing expert and 
popular narratives about flood prevention in the Levels that CBA has been unable to 
reconcile. 
This illustrates that environmental CBA is challenged where managed realignment policies 
encounter political difficulties: in many cases, there is distrust among local communities 
about government intervention and plans for coastal adaptation measures (Luisetti et al. 
2011). Abandoning land and property to the sea is considered as dereliction of a VWDWH¶V core 
duty to protect its citizens. In the case of the Steart, opponents claimed that birds were put 
before people and that the £20m spent on the re-alignment should have gone to hard flood 
                                                 
4
 HANSARD Commons 22 Jan 2014 vol 574 columns 124WH ± 134 WQH, speech by Mr Ian Liddell-Grainger 
MP in debate on flooding 
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defences instead of a ³ELUG VDQFWXDU\´5. This opinion, steered by a sense of insecurity 
following widespread river-basin flooding, expresses different value priorities than reflected 
in the CBA, but also there is uncertainty of evidence that managed realignment will deliver 
comparable ecosystem functionality to natural sites at different points in time (Morris 2013). 
Luisetti et al. (2011) conclude that managed realignment, when there are potential flood risks 
to a significant number of people and assets, provides a context for complex decision-making 
in which CBA does not necessarily provide decisive information on trade-offs.  
 
                                                 
5
 
www.theguardian.com/ environment/2014/sep/08/20m-pound-salt-marsh-somerset-wildlife-habitat-ghts-sea-
erosion.
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3.3 Marine renewables  
The marine environment (resource system) can represent a source of energy potentially 
meeting higher energetic demand (Astariz and Iglesias 2015). Offshore renewables are likely 
to play an important role in a suite of technologies (Pelc and Fujita 2002), with wind, tidal 
and wave energies (resource) a viable part of energy supply (Voke et al. 2013). The 
governance system for offshore developments is not yet well framed in many countries 
(Wright 2015), but it is commonly accepted that it requires (i) environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) for reducing damages, (ii) conflicts minimisation between uses and users 
(Scott et al. 2016; Graziano et al. 2017) to provide social and economic net benefits, and (iii) 
a flexible regulatory framework (Wright 2015) that neither impairs the needs of developers 
nor the wishes of civil society for an healthy environment. Considering the relatively young 
age of marine renewable energy technologies, a gap in the knowledge of the information-
chain between the final service (energy) and effects on human wellbeing is evident in the 
literature. An overview of environmental impacts on marine habitats and changes in 
ecosystem services are provided by Papathanasopoulou et al. (2015) for nuclear, oil and gas 
and offshore wind farm (OWF) industries. Some studies that focussed on OWF impacts and 
marine renewables are categorised according to the ecosystem services framework in Table 1. 
Overall, they show contradicting results on the likely impacts on provisioning and cultural 
services, and thus far little evidence in terms of potential impacts on regulating services.  
Table 1 here 
In terms of the latter, the observed increase in mussel abundance at OWF is likely to increase 
the capacity of the system to remediate waste as well as increasing food availability for other 
species (supporting service) (Wilhelmsson and Malm 2008). As regards provisioning 
services, there is a general lack of studies which investigate impacts of OWF on commercial 
fishery species. OWFs may have positive effects on commercial fish and shellfish stocks 
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through artificial reef effects (Wilhelmsson et al. 2006). It is found that the temporary closure 
of European lobster fishing ground due to OWF construction can benefit the increase in  
abundance and size (Roach et al, 2018). Mussels, brown crab, cod, pouting, eel and sole have 
been found to be more abundant near offshore turbines (Hooper and Austen 2014), but 
increase in abundance or biomass of fish and benthic species is not universal across all sites 
(Ashley et al. 2014) and does not automatically lead to an increase in catch rates within the 
fishery (Hooper et al.  2015).  
Studies on the perceived impacts of marine renewables on cultural ecosystem services are 
also emerging. Ladenburgh (2009), reviewing some studies on the preferences for OWF in 
relation to onshore development, showed that these preferences seem to be dependent on the 
specific place of location offshore. However, aesthetic impacts can be significantly reduced 
by locating wind farms at large distances from the coast (out of sight), a popular solution 
evidenced by a positive willingness to pay by the public (Ladenburgh and Lutzeyer 2012). 
Similar results are found by Voke et al. (2013) who assessed by using contingent valuation 
and travel cost methods that the potential impact of renewable energy generation on tourist 
visiting Pembrokeshire (UK), would put off visiting a limited number (3.5% of the sample) 
due to a visible marine energy development. This suggests that the potential  impacts on the 
recreational activities in coastal zones affected by the development of newer forms of marine 
renewable energy (tidal currents and waves) could be less adverse than those shown for OWF 
by Ladenburgh (2009).  
This classification of benefits and costs arising from marine renewables helps identify 
impacts and may facilitate a more transparent adoption of environmental CBA and EIA 
procedures (Wright 2015). However, ecological knowledge gaps about changes in marine 
functioning following marine renewables deployment weaken the possibility to value 
services by the production function approach and stated preference methods. For example, in 
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a choice experiment for the establishment of an MPA on the Dogger Bank (North Sea), while 
people showed willingness to pay for environmental improvement, about 25% of the sample 
stated that they did not have enough knowledge about the issues to make a choice (Borger et 
al. 2014). The difficulty and uncertainty in quantifying intangible costs and benefits that do 
not have a market (for example changes in conservation values of bird and marine mammals 
wildlife from the implementation of renewables) cause limitations in the use of CBA as a 
decision support tool, providing a lower confidence in the usability of the indicators of the 
economic acceptability of the project (Wright 2014). In addition, we must mention that the 
difficulties of addressing in a single monetary indicator the pluralities of views on renewables 
and the aversion of regulators for projects they perceive as risky (Neumann 2009) can lead to 
conflicts between stakeholders.  
A case study exemplifying these complexities is that of marine wind-farm developments to 
the east of Scotland. Four large interrelated developments totalling 0.5GW supposed to 
generate between £314m and £1.2bn for the Scottish economy and to create more than 500 
jobs during construction and more than 100 permanent jobs once operational were at stake6. 
Licences granted by the Scottish Government to allow these developments were overturned 
in 2016 by a judgement in the Scottish Court of Session.7  Publicly available documents from 
one of these studies, that of the Inch Cape Wind farm,8 show that there was no explicit CBA 
                                                 
6
 'Judgement threatens multi-billion pound Tay and Forth wind arrays'. Graham Huband: Dundee Courier July 
19 2016. The Courier.co.uk. Three development companies were involved: Inch Cape Offshore Limited, owned 
by Repsol Nuevas Energías UK (51 per cent) and EDP Renewables UK (49 per cent); Seagreen Wind Energy 
Limited, a 50/50 joint venture partnership between SSE (Scottish and Southern Energy plc) and Fluor Limited, 
the UK operating arm of Fluor Corporation; Geart na Gaoithe Offshore Wind Limited, owned by Mainstream 
Renewable Power. 
7
 Scotland Court of Session, Outer House: [2016] CSOH 103. Petition of The Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds for Judicial review 
8
 EIA and other documents can be found at: www.inchcapewind.com 
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for wind farm and impacts (externalities) to support the Government decision. However, the 
IDUP¶V Environmental Impact Assessment, required by law, considered these impacts and 
how to ameliorate them. It included an account of the benefits in jobs and extra income in the 
µ(FRQRPLF Study $UHD¶ in eastern Scotland, and more widely in terms of reduced emissions 
of greenhouse gases.9 
Development consents were granted by the Scottish Government in 2014, and were 
challenged by the (UK) Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB). The 2016 judge 
summarised the RSPB concerns for Atlantic puffin (Fratercula arctica), northern gannet 
(Morus bassanus) and black-legged kittiwake (Rissa tridactyla) as risk of collision with 
turbines, displacement from foraging areas and barrier effects such as foraging flights to and 
from breeding colonies. The latter two risks may entail extra energy costs and consequences 
for body mass, adult survival, nest attendance and chick provisioning (Scotland Court of 
Session, Outer House: [2016] CSOH 103. Petition of The Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds for Judicial review).  
The judgement is particularly interesting because it was decided in part by scientific 
evidence. In particular, the judge accepted RSPB arguments that the present state of scientific 
knowledge and art (in population modelling) was insufficient to show that the farm would not 
impact adversely on protected populations of seabirds. Under the European Union Birds 
Directive (72/49/EE  replaced by 2009/147/EC), which protects the birds, and the Habitats 
Directive (92/43/EEC), which protects their habitats insofar as they are designated, the 
precautionary principle applies, guaranteeing  protection excepting imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest (e.g. human health or public safety). The consequence is that 
potential damage to bird populations cannot be traded off against benefits in reductions of 
                                                 
9
 Chapters 8 and 22 of the EIA of 2013. 
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greenhouse gas emissions. The judgement also found that there had been procedural flaws in 
the way the licencing process had consulted stakeholders. 
The Scottish Government appealed this decision, and it was overturned in 2017 by the most 
senior judge of the Supreme Courts of Scotland.10 He concluded that the Government 
followed the law in giving consent and that the 2016 judge should not have tried to evaluate 
the scientific evidence. Clearly, the senior judge was trying to keep the law out of science and 
of decision-making based on scientific evidence. Yet this simply moves the locus of decision 
from one hierarchy (the law) to another (the government and its scientific advisors). Of the 
two alternative methods shown in Figure 2 for regulating the use of marine ecosystem 
services, economic valuation of ecosystem services and environmental CBA of the project 
seems not to have been used in any explicit fashion, and deliberative processes were largely 
restricted to those between Government and Statutory Consultees, of which those relevant 
here were the public bodies Scottish Natural Heritage and the UK Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee.11 It is possible that more ex-ante stakeholder deliberation, as recommended by 
Scott et al. (2016), might have led to a different wind-farm configuration allowing better 
recognition of non-utilitarian values and reduced the risk of lengthy and costly legal 
proceedings.  
 
                                                 
10
 Scotland Court of Session, Inner House: [2017] CSIH 31. Reclaiming Motions in the Petitions of The Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds against the Scottish Ministers etc. 
11
 Paragraphs 25, 38 of the 2016 judgement. 
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4 Discussion  
Although there is no doubt that human wellbeing depends on natural capital and ecosystem 
services (MEA 2005), there has been legitimate debate as to whether utilitarian or other types 
of ethical orientations might best sustain these services (Fisher et al. 2015). Large-scale 
initiatives have been implemented to explore relationships between ecosystem functioning, 
services and wellbeing and to develop mechanisms to recognise, demonstrate and capture 
values in decision making (MEA 2005; TEEB 2010; UK NEA 2011; 2014; IPBES -Diaz et 
al., 2015). While the approaches taken have so far largely reflected the notion of nature for 
people (Mace et al., 2014), there is a clear shift towards more integrated perspectives that 
consider nature and people (Mace et al. 2014) as a more inclusive relationship, and 
emphasise the importance of local inputs (views) to increase subsidiarity in the governance 
and to empower actions at the scale where they can weave a canvas of resilient interactions 
between human society and natural environment (Carpenter et al. 2009; Mace et al. 2014; 
Kenter, 2016a; Jacobs et al. 2016).  
In this discussion, we will (i) appraise the extent to which mainstream economic theory and 
methods could be practically useful in managing human-environment interactions in our case 
studies, (ii) provide an interpretation of the ecosystem services framework within an 
institutional economic context, and (iii) reflect on the opportunities for expanding the horizon 
of economic valuation of marine ecosystem services by using pluralistic deliberation to 
democratise decision making.  
 
4.1 The role of economics 
Mainstream economics emphasizes the importance of  valuing via stated or revealed  
preferences those ecosystem services that are typically undervalued in economic decision-
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making because they are provided free of charge as typical public goods (Turner and Daily 
2008) and because markets fail to adequately signal their true value (Ribaudo et al. 2010). 
This µXQGHUYDOXLQJ¶ is often considered a key factor in the decline, degradation, and in some 
cases irreversible loss of biodiversity (Ribaudo et al. 2010).  For these reasons, recent studies 
have called for methods for the valuation of ecosystem services and biodiversity, and for 
better understanding of their reciprocal relationships (Bennet et al. 2009) that might 
ultimately result in commodification of nature. Although the trend to commodification has 
led to protest from scientists, conservationists and political ecologists (Gomez-Baggethun and 
Ruiz-Perez 2011; McCauley 2006; Turnhout et al. 2013; Matulis 2014; Spash 2015), others 
have argued that a degree of commodification is necessary to embed protection of services in 
a market context (TEEB 2010; UK NEA 2011) and to facilitate long-term behavioural 
changes towards nature conservation (Burton and Schwartz 2013). Outside the market 
context, the monetary valuation of nature benefits can be used to inform trade-offs amongst 
development and conservation policies, although only a few successful instances of this have 
been documented so far, and in practice, policy makers rarely commission these for 
improving planning (Ruckelshaus et al. 2015; Laurans et al. 2013).  
Of our three examples, the economic valuation of ecosystem services and CBA were used 
only in one (Steart); it would seem to have potential in another (AC), and was explicitly 
disallowed by one interpretation of the law in the third (wind-farm). 
In relation to our first example, it seems possible that economic valuation could work in 
harmony with social norms and institutional rules when assessing social benefits of 
assimilative capacity. Currently assimilative capacity is an unacknowledged common good 
that generates free riders because of the false view that it is less costly to share the 
consequence of pollution rather than to internalise (e.g. privatise) the costs of treating a 
discharge. When assimilative capacity is not perceived as scarce, it does not generate 
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conflicts between users, as in our example. If it becomes scarce, or is perceived as scarce, 
regulatory or economic mechanisms can be arranged to reduce pollution by levying charges 
underpinned by the monetary valuation of the externality (Selman and Greenhalgh, 2009).  
Different considerations apply to the benefits provided by natural coastal defence, our second 
example. In the case of the Steart re-alignment, CBA allowed a net positive value to be 
identified for the scheme. Although there were gaps in scientific knowledge (da Silva et al. 
2014) and negative public reactions from the perceptions of the causes of severe inland 
flooding as well as agitation by the members of parliament representing the area, these did 
not prevent the top-down implementation of the scheme.12 In this example, there were no 
overwhelming technical difficulties, for example in eliciting stakeholders' preferences, that 
might compromise economic valuation. Nevertheless, even when the CBA is technically 
feasible, as in this case, it did not provide a ³heuristic aid´ in the decision making process 
(Turner 2007) because of limitations in engaging or hearing third parties (local and lesser 
voices). Moreover, the difficulties to take account of a plurality of views can generate 
distortions in the distribution of benefits between social classes and a consequent misleading 
interpretation on the welfare assessed by CBA for society as a whole (Turner et al. 2007). 
Finally, in the wind farm example, the decision by Government to licence development 
seems to have been based on policy grounds (helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) 
and perceived economic benefits, without an explicit CBA and without full monetization of 
ecosystem services. Although in the view of the 2016 judge, societal benefits could not be 
traded off against potential loss of seabirds, the 2017 judge concluded that Government 
simply needed to have followed the procedure laid down by the law, and that it had done this. 
Societal concerns emerged in the legal challenge from the RSPB, in this respect representing 
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 Hansard Commons , 22 Jan 2014, vol 574, cols 124WH-134WH 
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a part of society lying mostly outside the parts of Scotland that might benefit from wind-
farm-generated employment. At the least, this imperfect representation of societal concerns, 
and the argument within the legal hearing of the scientific knowledge gaps, has delayed the 
wind-farm development by three years or more. However, a greater role for economics would 
unlikely have helped to resolve the conundrum more effectively; rather, earlier stakeholder 
participation and enhanced deliberation may have allowed different interests and values to 
have been weighed and balanced sooner without resolving to a complex legal route. 
 
4.2 Ecosystem services and institutional analysis 
Ostrom¶V social ecological systems (Ostrom 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 
2014) describes how µµLQSXWV are transformed by the actions of multiple actors into 
RXWFRPHV¶¶ (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014, p. 34), while Rova and Pranovi (2017) and Nassl 
and Löffler (2015) focus more explicitly on analyzing the causal linkages between the system 
variables, explaining how ecosystem services µresource XQLWV¶) emerge from ecosystem 
structures and processes µresource V\VWHP¶). In this study, we  broaden the previous 
considerations on the governance of ecosystem services looking at how the institutional 
analysis (explaining the functions of a wide range of institutions such as government, the law, 
markets, etc.) would describe resource management based on choices at FLWL]HQV¶ level 
(public and private spheres), to complement decisions undertaken by markets (Slavikova 
2013) and government, and  to individuate weaknesses in natural resource governance 
(Ostrom 2007; Ostrom 2009). Looking at the assimilative capacity example, the pure market 
approach can be used to obtain efficient solutions, if conflicts from the perceived scarcity of 
the resources arise, by designing arrangements including regulations, economic tools (taxes, 
subsidies) and creations of new markets. These rules can be figured out as hierarchical 
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arrangements, involving a chain downwards from rulers to ruled that is underpinned by law 
and power, and a chain upwards from ruled to rulers (Habermas 1996)  that depends on the 
perceived legitimacy in the allocation of rights to polluters or polluted in ³consuming´ the 
assimilative capacity. In the example of coastal defense, the CBA and market level was 
supported by the downwards chain from government but opposed by the upwards chain 
originating in FLWL]HQV¶ wish to protect land and property from flooding. In the example of 
wind farms, the disagreements centered on conflicts between government agencies, 
developers and civil society owing to limited scientific information on offshore wind farms 
impacts.  This distrust reveals the limited inclusivity of voices from the bottom (Young 2002; 
Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2007), usually associated with decisions debated in local fora. This is 
evidenced by the difficulties of EIA in assisting local decision making in context of scientific 
uncertainties (Huertas-Oliveras and Norris 2008), and in supporting a broader democratic 
perspective to balance and reduce tension between opposing strategies such as the 
precautionary (reject any plan) and the risky approach (accept the plan even at high 
environmental costs) (Renewable UK 2011).  
 
Looking at these three ecosystem services under the lens of the framework proposed in 
Figure 3, it is evident how the governance represented by the Economic System, the 
Administrative system, and the Private & Public Spheres,  external to the institutional order 
of the lifeworld where communication frames the collective actions, is a limiting factor for 
the ability of stakeholders to engage in collective arrangements. Resource systems as 
indicated in Figure 1, or Environment in Figure 3, in the three examples require a number of 
relevant actors to influence the costs of cooperative actions (transaction costs). Moreover, a 
major factor affecting users (stakeholders of lifeworld in Figure 3) consists in the limited 
predictability of the dynamics of the environment, which led to failure in resource 
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governance as uncertainty in the consenting process for deploying marine renewables 
(Administrative system in Figure 3); and, flaws in social capital construction, including lack 
of trust in public protection of private property  in the Private & Public Spheres, which 
appeared to result in community aversion towards soft sea-defence schemes.  
 
 
4.3 Implications of results for economic valuation, use of CBA and democratic decision 
making  
When valuation is not severely restricted by the difficulties of using monetary metrics, CBA 
can play an important role as a ³GHFLVLRQ UXOH´ operating as one of multiple components of 
policy analysis (Turner 2007). However, the acceptability of the net present value of a project 
as a decisive element for decision making is not obvious. Although it is possible to find cases 
in the literature where economic valuation and CBA proved useful for management (e.g. 
Turner et al. 2007; Luisetti et al. 2011; 2014; Martino and Amos 2015; McDonald et al 
2017), there are many others where social concerns were stronger, undermining CBA 
applicability (e.g. da Silva et al 2014; Roca and Villares 2012; Myatt et al 2003; Myatt-Bell 
et al 2002; Irvine et al. 2016). 
Overall, CBA seems to have been more useful in coastal defence strategies than in managing 
the development of offshore renewable energy.  This may have been because of the better 
scientific knowledge of the ecosystem functions-ES interface in coastal and intertidal 
habitats, and the possibility of using stated preference methods to value services provided by 
relatively familiar environments (Hanley et al. 2015). Conversely, complexities are emerging 
when people are asked to state preferences for goods or services provided by unknown 
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environments as the deep sea (Glen et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012; Jobstvogt et al., 
2014b), making difficult to trade-off  marketed and non-marketed goods.  
Our examples show some key constraints to application of neoclassical valuation and CBA 
due to a lack of knowledge, about links between ecosystem functions, ecosystem services, 
and human well-being, among: 1) scientists working at the interface between ecology and 
economics to provide reliable economic valuation; and 2) users who do not receive sufficient, 
clear and balanced information of the services provided by ecosystems. Issues of limited 
information occur especially when science is not able to communicate clearly benefits arising 
from those services that appear as a mental construct rather than tangible goods (Barbier 
2007; Turner et al. 2007; Luisetti et al. 2011). Furthermore, at least three problematic 
assumptions of neoclassical valuation arise (Kenter et al. 2015): 1) the idea of the ³UDWLRQDO 
DJHQW´ with preferences characterised as independent and exogenous (Bowles and Gintis, 
2000); 2) that all values can be expressed as preferences; and 3) that social welfare is a 
cardinal measure of the sum of the preferences of independent individuals (Parks and Gowdy, 
2013). As regards the first and second point, behavioral literature recognises that values need 
not be preformed (i.e. existing as a priori ideas) but constructed through formal or informal 
deliberation (Shapansky et al. 2003; Kenter et al. 2016b,d) to shape decisions under societal 
perspectives rather than that of individual consumers (Lienhoop et al. 2015; Martinez-
Espineira 2007; Orchard-Webb et al. 2016). As regards the third point, Arrow (1950) showed 
that there is ³QR logically infallible way to aggregate the preferences of diverse LQGLYLGXDOV´ 
(cited by Feldman 1987: 894), therefore CBA cannot provide a consistent ranking of policy 
alternatives (Parks and Gowdy 2013).  
It is important to recognise that these limitations are not necessarily problematic; rather, they 
become so in cases that are complex, contested and with many stakeholders that harbour 
conflicting interests (Kenter 2016a). In these cases, there is increased likelihood that SHRSOHV¶ 
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values and behaviour will depart from the rational actor model and that commensuration of 
pluralistic values and aggregation through typical (Bergon-Samuelson) social welfare 
functions will raise moral and justice concerns. Thus, limits to the feasibility and legitimacy 
of pricing services and ranking projects by CBA are empirical (uncertainty about ES-welfare 
linkages), theoretical (assumptions of welfare economics are not always tenable) and political 
(perceived legitimacy is questioned). As summarized in Table 2 for the three examples, 
signals coming from civil society (shared perspectives and values, and institutional norms) 
may reduce the scope for economic valuation and CBA application, raising uncertainties on 
its applicability because of difficulties in addressing distributional equity (Pearce et al. 2006; 
Turner 2007; Turner et al. 2016).  
Table 2 here  
The efficient use of natural resources as a mechanism for improving human wellbeing 
according to a utilitarian view of nature can drive narrowly rational economic decisions into 
the realm of wicked problems where these apparently rational solutions run into complex 
social issues revolving around pluralistic values related to both process and outcomes. In 
turn, this can make the existing social-ecological system unstable (Folke 2006). Laws and 
customary norms may clash as exemplified by the conflicts between decisions on flood 
defences strategies, based on technocratic CBA, and FLWL]HQV¶ demands to receive protection 
for their properties from the state; and by the judicial review of offshore wind farm consent, 
which was overruled by the application of the precautionary approach applied to European 
protected areas. These two examples make evident the policy challenges of reconciling 
contested value realms and achieving consensus to create more inclusiveness that 
encompasses a greater social diversity and power (Fabinyi et al. 2014). Thus, there is the 
need to move from what might be called algorithmic allocation of preferences by market or 
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law, to a broader political debate amongst citizens by which their conflicting interests are 
reconciled (Sabatier 1998; Kenter et al. 2015; 2016b).  
This suggests using CBA differently in the political economy domain: 1) by reducing the 
scope of CBA as a tool addressing rational solutions (Randall 2002) especially in those 
contexts where broader ethical/moral imperatives and social justice issues are of central 
importance; and 2) by switching to a different perspective that considers CBA as an element 
supporting, but not steering, decisions (Turner 2007; 2016; Turner et al. 2014). This may also 
involve addressing the way economics weights benefits and costs, for example by including 
deliberation on how they should be aggregated (Kenter et al. 2016c), and complementing 
economics with other forms of valuation to depict a more comprehensive vision of what is 
needed to ensure sustainability in contexts such as energy developments and flood protection. 
For example, Orchard-Webb et al. (2016) exemplify a novel approach, Deliberative 
Democratic Monetary Valuation (DDMV; also see Kenter 2017), where a group of local 
stakeholders expressed values through several interpretive and deliberative tools, then 
evaluated different policy options using conceptual systems modelling, visioning and multi-
criteria analysis, before directly negotiating values for policies related to the marine 
environment. Ranger et al. (2016) demonstrated an approach where qualitative video 
interviews with a wide range of stakeholders were used to elicit plural values, which then fed 
into deliberative multi-criteria workshops where policy options were voted on. Reed and 
Kenter (2014) and Reed et al (2017) highlighted a study where DDMV was used to negotiate 
conflicts between stakeholders and directly establish fair prices for payments for ecosystem 
services in a peatland management context. These examples illustrate the need for 
deliberative processes  to help form shared values between different interests and reduce 
conflict. A range of key factors needs to be considered that influence this process of value 
formation (Kenter et al. 2016d), including for example education and prior experience to 
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process design and facilitation that can help manage power dynamics and actively support 
and enable participants in the translation of transcendental values, our overarching principles 
and life goals (Raymond and Kenter 2016), into more specific contextual values and value 
indicators. 
Deliberation is not just an important mechanism for value elicitation and formation, but also 
for value aggregation. When pluralistic values are recognised to be incommensurable, it can 
be left to formal political and legal processes to aggregate information, but this is challenged 
by significant institutional barriers (Turnpenny et al. 2014), and also does not account for 
SHRSOH¶V meta-values in relation to value aggregation (Kenter et al. 2016a; 2016b). To 
reconcile the different approaches at valuing and overcome the restrictions on applicability of 
CBA, Turner (2016) proposes that a modified form of CBA could be part of a triple balance 
sheet approach, a societal decision support system (Figure 8) that goes beyond the framework 
of economic efficiency to take account of shared values, equity, justice, and plurality of 
views. The framework suggests that in simple and non-contested contexts, a single balance 
sheet consisting of a modified version of CBA is adequate. When there is increased 
complexity and contestation, two further sheets can be added which address social impact 
assessment and broader shared and cultural values. Values are aggregated and value conflicts 
negotiated through deliberation. This provides a basis for collective arrangements for 
overcoming barriers, addressing social challenges and seizing opportunities in a ³SUDJPDWLF´ 
perspective where individuals and groups work towards agreement from initially contesting 
positions (Bromley 2004). This approach through its greater potential for Communicative 
Action (Habermas 1984; 1987), may be more fruitful for the understanding, improvement 
and implementation of environmental policies than the rational choice theory that holds that 
³FRUUHFW´ positions can be formulated by pre-determined (innate) preferences rather than 
being constructed by a deliberated process (Scott, 2000).  
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Figure 8 here 
5 Conclusions 
We have discussed the complexities of societal management of three ecosystem services. In 
the case of assimilative capacity for nutrients and waste in a sea-loch, there is scope for 
improving efficiency by imposing a charge for the use of this public good, in a way that 
harmonises with existing governance. In the case of coastal defence, the expert monetisation 
of the service and prioritisation of decisions under the CBA framework has conflicted with 
the way many local people think the state should protect life and property. In the case of 
offshore wind farms, the conflict represents two different perspectives on value, which were 
not reconciled in the planning process, leading to its ultimate breakdown through legal 
action; a more bottom-up, participatory approach that focused on reconciling different 
interests and values from the outset (rather than maximising net benefits) could conceivably 
have led to a different outcome.  
Provision of ecosystem services requires sustainable management of the natural capital 
underpinning these services, but equally the role of human, social and built capitals needs to 
be considered when assessing how these services and their benefits to human wellbeing are 
generated (Haines-Young and Potschin 2010; Costanza et al. 2014; 2017). Study of the 
complex interaction of these forms of capital can build on the foundation of institutional 
analysis (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). Under the consideration that many ecosystem services 
(mainly the regulating services) are public goods, poorly recognised within the market 
domain, institutional analysis is a necessary complement to economic analysis to individuate 
weaknesses in natural resource governance (Ostrom 2007; Ostrom 2009). The complexities 
in decision-making shows that the strategies relying exclusively on removing market failure 
do not produce satisfying results in resource management unless they also promote 
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participation in decision making by local stakeholders (Dietz et al. 2003). As we have 
illustrated, the requirements for managing ecosystem services are multiple and need not only 
economic information, but also capacity to deal with social conflicts, and flexibility to allow 
governance to better adapt via broader participation. Therefore, a mix of institutional types 
promoted by well-designed deliberation involving scientists, resource users and citizens is 
needed to integrate evidence and values, to bridge inevitable conflicts, to enable social 
learning and to implement a diversity of adaptive governance strategies that can effectively 
and sustainably oversee natural resources.  
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Figure 1: A multi-tier framework for analyzing a Social-Ecological 6\VWHP¶ redrawn with 
slight modifications from Ostrom (2007) 
 
Figure 2: A social-ecological system (Tett & Sandberg, 2011) showing the three routes by 
which ecosystem services can be allocated within human societies. A feedback loop from 
society to ecosystem considered is not shown, but we recognize that natural events and 
human activities are the drivers of pressures on the state of the ecosystem; changes in 
ecosystem services impact on society and bring about a management response. Some of the 
allocation mechanisms include feed-back loops (e.g. the response of price changes on 
demand for a particular service; see UK NEA, 2014 and Diaz et al., 2015 for a specific 
description of a circular pattern between ES provision and institutional response).  
 
Figure 3. A social ecological system linking the Habermas view of model of society (1987) 
with the social-ecological system provided by Ostrom (2007) and shown in Figure 1. 
Ostrom's users are to be found in within the two spheres of the lifeworld, constrained there 
by societal norms, and within the two media-steered major subsystems of organised society, 
where they are constrained by the relevant medium.  
 
Figure 4: map of the case studies. On the left a map of the UK. On the right a zoom in the 
sites where example are borrowed. Loch Creran (figure 4.1) is a fjord in the Argyll region of 
Scotland and is considered for the social-economic analysis of assimilative capacity; the 
Somerset Levels (figure 4.2) are a coastal plain and wetland area in south west England and 
are considered here to discuss the case of coastal managed realignment; the Firth of Forth 
(figure 4.3) is the estuary of the River Forth and several other Scottish rivers and is 
considered for the analysis of the offshore wind farm case.  
 
Figure 5: Assimilative Capacity of a water body for an anthropogenic waste 
Seawater circulates through the example water body, loch Creran. The concentration of 
anthropogenic waste added to the loch (for example by a fish-farm) depends on the rate of 
loading with the waste, the rate of its loss to local removal processes, and the rate of loss to 
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the water circulation. Other things being equal, the concentration increases with load. 
Regulators set a maximum allowable concentration (an Environmental Quality Standard, 
EQS) of the waste. Assimilative capacity is the excess of this EQS over the background 
concentration of the waste substance in the seawater that is flushing the loch.  For further 
details of loch Creran's circulation see Tett (2008) and Tett et al. (2011a). 
 
Figure 6: Assimilative Capacity (AC) is a bio-physical measure of the ability of an ecosystem 
to absorb anthropogenic inputs of substances without damaging the health of the ecosystem 
or its ability to provide goods and services (Tett et al., 2011). In the present case, the 
substances are organic waste, plant nutrients, and fish-treatment medicines. AC relies on the 
proper functioning of ecosystem processes including, in the case study, dilution of loch 
contents by external sea-water, cycling of nutrients, and decomposition of organic matter. AC 
is not infinite and is bounded by the intrinsic limits of the environment. If overcome, this 
function is lost and provides a reduction of water quality, which generates disutility to the 
end users. 
 
Figure 7: /LQHDU cDVFDGHEHWZHHQIXQFWLRQLQJHFRV\VWHPVHUYLFHVDQGEHQHILWVIRUWKHFRDVWDO
GHIHQFHFDVHVWXG\ZKHUHWKHSURGXFWLRQRIQHZFRDVWDOKDELWDWSURYLGHFRQWURORIZDYHV
UHJLPHDQGIDFLOLWDWHWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHLQZDUGVFDSLWDODVVHWVDQGXVHVRIODQGVXFKDV
DJULFXOWXUHRUXUEDQLQGXVWULDOH[SDQVLRQ6RXUFHDGDSWHGIURP/XLVHWWLHWDO 
 
Figure 8: The Triple Balance Sheet approach (simplified from Turner et al., 2016). `Tame' 
problems relating to the use of ecosystem services should be soluble by straightforward 
economic analysis as in the left-hand column. More complex and `wicked' problems (Jentoft 
& Chuenpagdee, 2009) require the additional columns of analysis 
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Table 1: Summary of some recent studies on environmental impacts of renewables on the marine environment arranged under the logic of the 
ecosystem service terminology (according to UK NEA (2011) and CICES (2016) 
Ecosystem 
service 
Issues Comments Authors 
Provisioning 
services 
Commercial fishery Higher abundance of commercial fish and shellfish through artificial 
reef effects, but not recognised universally; 
 
Species richness and diversity reduced around the turbines; 
 
No direct effects on catch rates within the fishery; 
 
Sensitivity of rays, eels, cod, plaice to electromagnetic field of OWF 
Wilhelmsson et al. (2006);  
 
 
Hooper and Austen (2014);  
 
Hooper et al. (2015); 
 
Andersson and Öhman (2010);  
Hooper and Austin (2015) 
Gill et al. (2005); Gill et al., 
2012 
Regulating 
services 
Nutrient decomposition, 
gas regulation, etc. 
Very limited studies and no relevant results 
 
Abundance at OWF foundations is likely to increase the capacity of 
the system to remediate waste 
 
Mainly studies on community structure and diversity of habitats, 
behavioural changes of species and changes in abundance of species 
associated with construction and operation  
 
 
Wilhelmsson and Malm (2008) 
 
 
Brandt et al. (2011); Skeate et 
al. (2012);  
Cultural 
services  
Seascape and cultural 
services 
Valuation of gain and loss changes for local residents in cultural 
services provided by seascape of the west coast of Schleswig-
Holstein (Germany) in a context of OWF development. Offshore 
location of development limits the loss of amenity/aesthetic values, 
Gee and Burckard (2010) 
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but not the threat to nature and the symbolic value of the sea 
Values of preferences  Change in preferences for OWF in relation to onshore/offshore 
location of the development. Offshore location of development 
limits the loss of cultural values measured as WTP 
Ladenburgh (2009), 
Ladenburgh and Lutzeyer 
(2012); Voke et al. (2013) 
Biodiversity  Scientific impacts to 
biodiversity  
Contradictory results on animal impacts show both detrimental 
effects and limited direct impacts to avian population  
Inger et al. (2009); Hattam et 
al. (2015) 
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68 
Table 2: Different signals (defined using Habermassian categories in bracket) from the civil 
society for the three ecosystem services considered in the proposed examples addressing 
changes at local scales under the imperfect possibility to use only an economic approach to 
deal with the complexities of ecosystem services provision.  
 
Type of Signal  ᇄ
 
Ecosystem Services  
Ð 
Economic 
[money-
steered/markets]  
Social  
[lifeworld/deliberativ
e] 
Institutional  
[power-steered]  
Assimilative capacity Reduced damages 
by pricing 
pollution, but in 
case of overtaking 
AC threshold.  
Sense of danger for 
pollution amongst 
stakeholders.  
Clear definition of 
property/user rights 
in negotiating how to 
reduce pollution.  
Coastal defence Valuation for 
assessing avoided 
damages and 
social-economic 
impacts of 
protection 
provided by 
natural dynamics  
Sense of non- 
protection (insecurity 
felt by communities) 
provided by natural 
habitats 
Use of 
environmental CBA 
of coastal defence, 
including 
externalities and 
benefits from ES 
Energy from 
renewables 
Mobilising 
capitals into the 
industry/valuation 
via EIA, financial 
discounted cash 
flow and CBA  
Failure in science in 
providing the right 
information on MRE 
impacts on habitats 
and species 
Precautionary 
principle applied in 
EU environmental 
policies 
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